Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities by Federico Echenique
DRAFT





I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in
normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria
is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows
the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of xed points of a
correspondence. The correspondence has a natural interpretation. My results are
limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out|
surprisingly|to be a very restrictive class of games.
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In this paper I dene extensive-form games of strategic complementarities and prove the
subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games
of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) is a non-
empty, complete lattice. This has strong implications; not only does it give a general
existence proof, it also allows the use of comparative statics techniques. 1 While this
seems to be a promising result, I also show that, in extensive-form games, the assumption
of strategic complementarities is|surprisingly|very restrictive.
Equilibria are usually analyzed by means of xed-point methods. This has not been
the case for SPNE. A methodological contribution of this paper is the introduction of
a device, the \extended best-response correspondence", with the property that the set
of SPNE of a game coincides with the set of xed points of the extended best-response
correspondence. The model of extensive-form games that I use allows time to be contin-
uous, so the extended best-response correspondence can also be used to analyze SPNE
of continuous-time games.
Existence of SPNE in nite games (nite number of players, of actions, and of stages)
follows from Zermelo's Theorem. Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) present an example
of a game without an SPNE that is a two-stage game with a nite number of players and
where only one player has an innite strategy space. Hence, existence of SPNE is not
guaranteed after a minimal departure from the hypothesis of Zermelo's Theorem.
Here I show that the existence of SPNE follows from strategic complementarities;
concretely, that the set of SPNE of an game whose normal-form is a game of strategic
complementarities, is a non-empty, complete lattice.
Proofs of existence of SPNE in non-nite games are provided by Harris, Reny, and
Robson (1995) for games of almost-perfect information where a public randomization
device is present, by Harris (1985b), Harris (1985a) and Hellwig and Leininger (1987) for
1It can be shown that monotone comparative statics techniques would, among other things, eliminate
the need to focus on Markov-Perfect equilibria in many dynamic oligopoly models. I chose not to stress






































































Figure 1: Optional Battle of the Sexes
games of perfect information; and by Fudenberg and Levine (1983) for classes of games
with strong \continuity at innity" properties.
My results apply to continuous-time games and to games of imperfect information
that are not necessarily games of almost-perfect information. I am not aware of any
other existence result that applies to continuous-time games. I do not impose any struc-
ture on games beyond complementarities and conventional topological assumptions|the
important problem with my results is that the assumption of complementarities is very
strong.
Games of strategic complementarities were rst studied by Topkis (1979) and intro-
duced into economics by Vives (1990). There are many examples of economic models
that are games of strategic complements (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Topkis (1998),
and Vives (1999)). By now it is fair to say that complementarities in normal-form games
is a very useful and common structure. Here I show that, while still very useful, comple-
mentarities in dynamic contexts are rare.
To illustrate the problem, consider the game in Figure 1. This is \Optional Battle
of the Sexes". Here, player One chooses rst to say Yes or No. If One says No then
payos are 1 each. If One says Yes then they play a Battle of the Sexes game: they
simultaneously choose an element of fO;Bg.I ft h ec h o i c ei s( O;O) then player One gets
2 while Two gets 1. If they choose (O;B)o r( B;O) then both get a payo of 0. If the
outcome is (B;B) then payos are (1;2)
It is easy to see that Battle of the Sexes (BoS, the simultaneous-move game that
follows after One chooses Yes) is a game of strategic complementarities. Player One's
2best response to Two playing B is to play B and One's response to Two playing O is to
play O. So, a change by Two from B to O makes One change in the same direction. This
is also true for player Two: a change by One from B to O makes Two change in the same
direction. Imposing an order on the players' strategies, we can say that O is \larger"
than B. Then the best response of each player is increasing in the other player's choice
of strategy, this is the crucial property of a game of strategic complementarities (indeed
it is easily seen that BoS satises the denition of a game of strategic complementarities
in e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
Now, consider the extensive-form game Optional BoS and let us impose an order on
the set fNo;Yesg. Let the action \Yes" at One's initial decision node be larger than
\No". Then the strategy No-O (say No at the initial node and plan to play O in Battle
of the Sexes) is smaller than Yes-O and No-B is smaller than Yes-B. But, when One
is playing No-B it is optimal for Two to play O, while if we increase One's strategy to
Yes-B then it is uniquely optimal for Two to play B. This implies that Two's strategy
is not increasing in One's strategy choice. We could try to x this by saying that B is
larger than O, but then the problem would arise when One increases the strategy from
No-O to Yes-O.
It turns out that it is possible to make Optional BoS a game of strategic comple-
mentarities. The solution is to say that the action Yes is smaller than No. This shows
that extensive-form games of strategic complementarities are not trivial. 2 But unfortu-
nately the simple solution in Optional BoS is not feasible in general. I shall show how
a complication of Optional BoS yields a game that cannot be transformed into a game
of strategic complementarities. I will argue also that most dynamic games of economic
interest cannot be transformed into games of strategic complementarities.
Section 2 presents denitions and notation. Section 3 introduces the extended best-
response correspondence and the main results of the paper. Section 4 show how comple-
mentarities are a restrictive assumption by discussing some examples.
2It is not true that they must be dominance-solvable, as might be suggested by the discussion above.
32 Generalized Extensive-Form Games
2.1 Basic Denitions and Notation
A detailed discussion of the concepts dened in this subsection is in Topkis (1998). A set
X with a transitive, reﬂexive, antisymmetric binary relation  is a lattice if whenever
x;y 2 X,b o t hx ^ y =i n ffx;yg and x _ y =s u p fx;yg exist in X.I t i s complete
if for every nonempty subset A of X,i n fA;supA exist in X. For two subsets A;B of
X,s a yt h a tA is smaller than B in the strong set order if a 2 A, b 2 B implies
a ^ b 2 A;a_ b 2 B.T h eorder-interval topology on a lattice is obtained by taking
the closed intervals [x;y]=fz 2 X : x  z  yg as a sub-basis for the closed sets. All
lattices in the paper will be endowed with the order-interval topology. All products of
partially ordered sets are endowed with the product order. All products of topological
spaces are endowed with the product topology.
If X is a lattice, a function f : X ! R is quasisupermodular if for any x;y 2 X,
f(x)  f(x ^ y) implies f(x _ y)  f(y)a n df(x) >f(x ^ y) implies f(x _ y) >f(y). 3
Let T be a partially ordered set. A function f : X  T ! R satises the single-
crossing condition in (x;t) if whenever x  x0 and t  t0, f(x;t)  f(x0;t) impliesthat
f(x;t0)  f(x0;t 0)a n df(x;t) <f (x0;t) implies that f(x;t0) <f (x0;t 0). The restriction
of a function f : X ! Y to a subset X0  X is denoted fjX0.
2.2 Denition of Generalized Extensive-Form Games
I present a denition of extensive-form games that has information sets, as opposed to
decision nodes, as primitives. It is really only a slight variation on the usual rules for
drawing game trees, but it results in a considerably more general framework because it
allows time to be continuous and does not impose perfect recall or partitioned information
structures. 4 I hope that the benets of having results that apply to continuous-time
games are important enough to balance the cost of a slightly unfamiliar framework.
3Quasisupermodularity is an ordinal notion of complementarities, it was introduced by Milgrom and
Shannon (1994).






































Figure 2: An extensive-form game of strategic complementarities
Besides its generality, this model of extensive-form games is more parsimonious than the
usual one, therefore the proofs are easier and sharper than they would be otherwise.
I shall use the simplegame in Figure2 to illustratethe conceptsas theyare introduced.
The game can be described as follows. First, player One selects an element in fL;Rg.I f
she selects L then the game \ends" and the payos are 2 to player One and 0 to player
Two. If she selects R then Two gets to choose between l and r.I fh ec h o o s e sl then she
g e t s1w h i l eO n eg e t s0 . I fh ec h o o s e sr then player One gets to choose an element in
fL0;R 0g. Payos are (0;0) and (3;1) after One chooses L0 and R0, respectively. Let a1
b et h e r s tn o d ea tw h i c hp l a y e rO n em o v e s ,a2 be the second node at which she moves
and b be the node at which player Two moves.
A generalized extensive-form game will be described as follows. Let N = f1;:::ng be
the set of players. Let H be a set; the elements of H will be referred to as \information
sets". Let H = fH :  2 Ig be a collection of subsets of H and fHi : i 2 Ng a partition
of H. The interpretation will be that player i is endowed with a collection Hi of infor-
mation sets and that the elements of H = [n
i=1Hi are the information sets of the game.
For each  2 I, H  H should be interpreted as a \subgame" of H (this interpretation
is made precise below).
In the example in Figure 2, N = f1;2g, H = fa1;a 2;bg, H1 = fa1;a 2g and H2 = fbg.
There are three subgames in the example, let I = f0; 1; 2g, H0 = fa1;a 2;bg, H1 =
fa2;bg,a n dH2 = fa2g; H = fH0;H 1;H 2g.
I make two assumptions about H, the collection of \subgames". First, that H itself
belongs to this class of subgames. Let 0 2 I satisfy H = H0. Second, if fH :  2 I0g
5H is a subcollection of H such that any ;0 2 I0 satisfy either H  H0 or H0  H,
then [2I0H 2H . That is, I assume that H is closed under increasing unions. For
every  2 I, fHi : i 2 Ng induces a partition on H:l e tHi
 = H \ Hi be the set of
player i's information sets in subgame H.N o t e t h a t Hi = fHi
 :  2 Ig is also closed
under increasing unions. It is easy to verify that the example in Figure 2 satises these
assumptions, as does any well-dened game tree.
The players choose actions at each of their information sets. For each h 2 H,l e t
A(h) be the set of actions available to the player that moves at information set h.
Each A(h) is endowed with a Hausdor topology. The set of all possible actions is
denoted by A = [h2HA(h). Player i's strategy space in subgame  2 I is Si
 =
fs : Hi
 !A: s(h) 2 A(h) for all h 2 Hi
g = h2HA(h). Let S = n
i=1Si
.E a c hp l a y e r
is endowed with preferences over strategy proles in subgame  2 I. These preferences
are represented by a collection of payo functions ui
 : S ! R.
In the example, A(a1)=fL;Rg, A(b)=fl;rg and A(a2)=fL0;R 0g,s ot h a t
A = fL;L0;R;R 0;l;rg. The strategy space for player 1 for the whole game is S1
0 =
fLL0;LR 0;RL 0;RR 0g|where LL0 means that 1 plans to play L at her rst decision node,
a1,a n dt h e nL0 at her second decision node, a2, and so on. The strategy space for player
2 for the whole game is simply S2
0 = fl;rg. The strategy spaces for the other subgames
are S1
1 = fL0;R 0g, S2
1 = fl;rg, S1
2 = fL0;R 0g and S2
2 = f;g. The choice of ; for player
2 in subgame 2 formalizes that only 1 makes a choice in this subgame. The players' pref-







2(L0;;) = 0, etc.
Denition 1 A collection of payo functions fu
i : i 2 N; 2 Ig is consistent if, for
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 ). The collection of payo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 ) is an upper semi-
continuous function.
6Payos are consistent if, given opponents' strategy s−i, whenever si
 performs better
than ~ si
 in subgame H  H0 and zi
0 performs better than si
 in subgame H0,i tm u s t
be that the combined strategy that follows si
 in Hi
nHi
0 and follows zi
0 in Hi
0, cannot
perform worse than ~ si
.
The payos in the example are consistent: Fix the strategy s2
0 = l by player 2 in
subgame 0, the \whole" game. Given any strategy s1
0, player 1's payo is independent
of choices in node a2. In particular, choosing R0, the dominant strategy in subgame 2,
does not decrease the payo to following s1
0.N o w , c o n s i d e r s2
0 = r.T h e o n l y c a s e
where the requirement consistency has bite is for the strategy LL0. In subgame 0, LL0
is preferred by 1 to RL0. But, in subgame 2, R0 is better than L0. Consistency then
requires that LR0 be preferred to RL0 in subgame 0|which is satised by the specied
payos.
The example illustrates why payos in any well-dened game tree are consistent.
Given i's strategy si
 and opponents' strategies s−i
 , if a subgame 0 is not reached then
i is indierent among her choices in this subgame and she cannot do worse by picking
something that is better in the subgame. On the other hand, if subgame 0 is reached
then payos will be given by choices in 0. Choosing a better strategy in subgame 0 can
only improve the payo to si
.
The denition of a generalized extensive-form game is complicated enough to warrant
an enumeration of its components:
Denition 2 The sextuple Γ=fN;H; fH :  2 Ig; fHi : i 2 Ng; fA(h):h 2 Hg;
fui
 : i 2 N; 2 Igg is a generalized extensive-form game if:
 N = f1;2;:::ng is the set of players;
 H is a set of information sets;
f Hi : i 2 Ng is a partition of H;
f H :  2 Ig is a collection of subsets of H that is closed under increasing unions
and such that H0 = H for some 0 2 I;
7f A(h):h 2 Hg is a collection of action sets, each endowed with a Hausdor topo-
logy and compact;
f u
i : i 2 N; 2 Ig is a collection of consistent payo functions that satises con-
tinuity.
For any subgame  2 I, Γ induces naturally an extensive-form game Γ:l e tH be
the set of information sets of Γ, let the subgames γ 2 I with Hγ  H be the subgames
of Γ; and let action sets and payos be dened as in Γ. I will use \subgame" to denote
both the set H and its corresponding extensive-form game Γ.
A strategy prole s is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in subgame
 2 I if, for every γ 2 I such that Hγ  H and every i 2 N,
s
i








I shall refer to the SPNE in subgame 0, the whole game, as simply SPNE. Note that a
strategy prole is a SPNE if and only if its restriction to any subgame is a SPNE in that
subgame.
Denition 3 A generalized extensive-form game Γ is an extensive-form game of
strategic complementarities if A(h) is a complete lattice for all h 2 H and if, for




 ) is quasisupermodular on Si
,a n dui
 satises the
single-crossing condition in (si
;s −i
 ).
It is slightly cumbersome to show that the game in Figure 1, has strategic comple-
ments. I leave this for section 4.
2.3 Examples of Generalized Extensive-Form Games
2.3.1 Optional BoS
I shall present the current notation for the \Optional Battle of the Sexes" game from
the introduction. Let a1 be the initial node, b b et h en o d ea tw h i c hp l a y e rT w om o v e s
and a2 be One's information set after that Two has moved. Then, H = fa1;a 2;bg,
8H1 = fa1;a 2g, H2 = fbg. There are two subgames, so I = f0; 1g, H0 = fa1;a 2;bg
and H1 = fb;a2g. Action spaces are A(a1)=fYes;Nog, A(b)=A(a2)=fO;Bg.
Strategy spaces are S1




2.3.2 Battle of the Sexes in Continuous Time
The game is a Battle of the Sexes played in continuous time. As Anderson (1984) and
Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) point out, the map from strategies to outcomes might
not be well dened in continuous-time games, which implies that we cannot dene the
payos resulting from dierent strategy proles. I will not spell out the details in Simon
and Stinchcombe's (1989) model of continuous-time extensive-form games, I only present
a simple example (that in fact falls within Simon and Stinchcombe's framework).
To avoid problems with the map from strategies to outcomes, I impose that players
must switch infrequently from one action to the other. Time is indexed by t 2 [0;1].
Assume that players choose either O or B at time t = 0. Their decisions remain xed
for a period  2 (0;1); at time t =  they can choose to switch, represented by action 1,
or not to change their time 0 choice, represented by action 0. An any posterior time t,
players are allowed to choose 1 only if they have chosen 0 in [t − ;t). That is, switches
are irreversible for a length of time . The players' \ﬂow" payos are as in BoS in the
introduction. If, at time t, they both choose O then One gets a payo of 2 while Two
gets a payo of 1; when they both choose B, then One gets 1 while Two gets 2. If they
choose dierent actions at time t then they both get a payo of 0.






k)a n dw h e r eti
l is the time of the lth switch by player i.B y t h e
description above, we must have ti
l − ti
l−1   for l =2 ;:::k and ti
k  t.P l a y e ri starts
with action O if ti
1 = 0, with action B if ti
1 > 0. Any feasible ht is called a time-t history.
Let Ht be the set of all time-t histories.
The set of all information sets is H = [t2[0;1]Ht.A n y h i s t o r y ht starts a subgame
Hht = fh 2 H : t  ;hjt = htg,w h e r ehjt = ht means that h and ht coincide on
9switches before time t. For any history ht, the actions available to player i are f0;1g
or, if she has switched recently (so t − tk < ), f0g. I will show that the collection of
information sets is closed under increasing unions. Let
n
Hht : ht 2 ~ H
o
be an increasing
collection of subgames and let t =i n f
n
t : ht 2 ~ H
o
. Then, all histories ht coincide on
switches up to t,l e tht be this common history. It is immediate that Hht = [ht2 ~ HHht.
Similarly, the collection of information sets is closed under intersections.
Strategies are maps ht 7! si(ht) 2 Ai(ht), where Ai(ht)i sf0g if the last switch in ht
was later than t −  and Ai(ht)i sf0;1g else. A pair of strategies dene, recursively, a
nite collection of switches. A nite collection of switches gives, through the denition
of ﬂow payos above, the payo associated to the strategy prole. Additivity of payos
(from ﬂow payos) implies immediately that payos are consistent.
3 The Extended Best-Response Correspondence and
Strategic Complementarities
3.1 Main Results
In this paper I shall focus on subgame-perfect equilibria. In order to keep track of









. This is the set of lists si 2 2ISi
 so that the
component si
 2 Si
 that corresponds to subgame H coincides with the restriction of
si
0 2 Si
0|the strategy for the whole game|to subgame H.L e t S = n
i=1Si.F o r
the example in Figure 2, recall that S1
0 = fLL0;LR 0;RL 0;RR 0g, S1
1 = fL0;R 0g,a n d
S1















which is really the same set as S1
0. In general Si and Si are isomorphic: identify si 2S i
with si
0 2 Si. In the rest of the paper I will frequently identify S and S.























; for all  2 I
	
:
The game's extended best-response correspondence is  : S  S, dened as (s)=
i2Ni(s).
Player i's extended best-response correspondence assigns a strategy that is a best
response in each subgame to her opponents' strategy. A game Γ's SPNE can be analyzed
by means of its extended best-response correspondence .L e m m a1s h o w st h eu s e f u l n e s s
of the extended best-response construction. The construction of  shows immediately
why Lemma 1 is true, so the lemma's proof is omitted.
Lemma 1 The set of SPNE of a generalized extensive-form game equals the xed points
of its extended best-response correspondence.
Lemma 2 shows that  is not a vacuous construction. The idea behind its proof is
simple. Given opponents' strategies s−i
0,i fsi
0 is a best response for player i in the whole
game H0,t h e nsi
0 should prescribe a best response for subgames that are reached under
s−i
0.A l s o ,i is indierent between strategies on subgames that are not reached. Modifying
si
0 to play a best response to s−i
0 also on non-reached subgames yields, by consistency of
payos, a strategy that is still a best response to s−i
0 in the original game H0. Repeating
this operation \subgame by subgame" we can obtain an element in (s).
The reasoning \subgame by subgame" suggests a proof by induction. Even in simple
games (like innitely repeated bimatrix games) the set of subgames is uncountable, so a
proof by induction is not possible. The proper tool turns out|expectedly|to be Zorn's
Lemma.
Lemma 2 For all s 2S , (s) is not empty.





Tychono's Theorem implies that Si
 is compact, so i
(s−i) is nonempty because Si






(s−i)g be the set of pairs of best responses and subgames.










is immediate to verify that  is a partial order on Ω.




) 2 Ω: 2 ~ I
o
.L e t^ H = [2~ IHi
,s i n c eHi is closed under increasing unions
^ H 2H i.L e tγ 2 I satisfy Hi
γ = ^ H. For any h 2 Hγ,t h e r ei s 2 ~ I such that h 2 H;
construct si
γ 2 Si
γ by setting si
γ(h)=si
(h). Since ~ Ω is linearly ordered, si
γ is well dened.
I will show that (Hi
γ;s i






 for all  2 ~ I.L e tsi
γ 2 i

















, and directing ~ I by set inclusion. Note
that si
γ() ! si
γ in the product topology. Fix any ~ si
γ 2 Si






γ )  ui
γ(si
γ;s−i













 ). By consistency of payos, then, for any  2 ~ I, ui
γ(~ si
γ;s−i







γ )  ui
γ(si
γ;s−i
γ ), as si
γ() ! si
γ and payos are upper semi-continuous.
This shows that (Hi
γ;s i
γ) 2 Ω, so (Hi
γ;s i
γ) is an upper bound on ~ Ω.
The linearlyordered set ~ Ω was arbitrary. ByZorn's lemma there is a maximal element,
say (Hi
 ;s i
), of Ω. Suppose Hi
 6= Hi














.N o w ,( Hi
 ;s i











































Construct si 2S i by setting si
 = si
0jHi
 for all  2 I. It is then immediate that




Extended best-response correspondences translate the problem of nding SPNE to
a xed point problem. By adding the assumption of strategic complementarities, xed
points are obtained by a version of Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem and the sets of SPNE
12can be analyzed by \lattice programming" techniques. Potentially, though, extended
best-response correspondences are useful in other classes of extensive-form games as well.
Theorem 1 If Γ is an extensive-form game of strategic complementarities, then its
SPNE form a non-empty, complete lattice.
Proof: I need to show that  is monotone increasing in the strong set order and takes
non-empty, closed values in order to apply Zhou's (1994) version of Tarski's xed point
theorem. First I show that  is monotone increasing in the strong set order. Let s;z 2S
with s  z.L e ts0 2 (s)a n dz0 2 (z). By Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994),
for every  2 I, s0 i




 )a n ds0 i




Hence, s0_z0 2 (z)a n ds0^z0 2 (s), proving that  is increasing in the strong set order.
That  takes closed values is an immediate consequence of upper semi-continuity of
payos in each subgame. By Lemma 2,  takes non-empty values. Hence, by Zhou's
version of Tarski's xed point theorem, the set of xed points of  is a complete lattice.
Lemma 1 implies that the set of SPNE is a complete lattice. 
Theorem 1 implies that there is a smallest and a largest SPNE of any extensive-
form game of strategic complementarities. Note that the subgames of any extensive-form
game of strategic complements are also extensive-form games of strategic complements.
By Theorem 1, then, each subgame has a smallest and a largest SPNE strategy prole.
It turns out that the extremal SPNE of any subgame are obtained from the extremal
SPNE of the whole game. 5
The collection of subgames fH :  2 Ig is closed under intersections if for any
;0 2 I,t h e r ei s 2 I such that H = H \ H0. Any well-dened game tree has sub-
games that are closed under intersections (in fact subgames are either nested or disjoint,
so they are trivially closed under intersections).
Theorem 2 Let Γ be an extensive-form game of strategic complementarities with sub-
games that are closed under intersections; let s be its smallest SPNE and s its largest
5This has important consequences. It can be seen that, in multi-stage games, the extremal equilibria
are Markov-Perfect.
13SPNE. If H with  2 I is any subgame, then sjH and sjH are, respectively, the smallest
and largest SPNE of the extensive-form game corresponding to H.
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a subgame H with a smallest
SPNE strategy prole s that is not equal to sjH.L e t~ S = f^ s 2S: ^ s = sg,b y
repeating the arguments above we obtain that ~ S is a complete lattice. Let ~  : ~ S  ~ S be
dened by ~ (s)=
n


















γ jH = s
i
;i2 N; and γ 2 I;Hγ * H
o
:
That ~  is monotone increasing in the strong set order and closed-valued follows from
arguments similarto those proving that  is monotone increasing and closed-valued. That
~  has non-empty values can be proved by following the steps in the proof of Lemma 2,
and restricting the optimizing strategies to equal si
 on information sets that also belong
to H.
By Zhou's version of Tarski's Theorem, there is a xed point s 2 ~ S of ~ .I c l a i m
that this is a SPNE of the whole game H0.F i xi 2 N. For any γ 2 I with Hγ  H,
s0jHγ = sjHγ.B u t si
0jHγ 2 i
γ(s)s i n c eHγ is a subgame of H and s is a SPNE in
H.L e tγ 2 I with Hγ * H. Γ has subgames that are closed under intersections, hence
there is  2 I with H = Hγ \H.S i n c eH is a subgame of H, s = sjH so s 2 i
(s)
because s is a SPNE in subgame H. Then, si
γ 2 i






γ ) <u i
γ(^ si
γ;s−i
γ )i tm u s tb et h a t^ si
γ and si
γ dier on the subgame H = Hγ \ H.






















impossible since s 2 ~ (s). Hence, si
γ 2 i
γ(s) for any γ 2 I so s is a SPNE.
By Theorem 1 there is a SPNE ~ s = s^s0 because the set of SPNE is a lattice. Since
s and s0 dier on H,~ s is smaller than s, a contradiction. 
Once the structure of complementarities is present, comparative statics results for the


































































































































Figure 3: Optional BoS II
Denition 5 Let T be a partially ordered set. The collection Γ(t):t 2 T is an increas-
ing family of extensive-form games if, for any t 2 T, Γ(t)=fN;H; fH :  2 Ig;
fHi : i 2 Ng; fAt(h):h 2 Hg; fui
t: i 2 N; 2 Igg is an extensive-form game of strate-
gic complementarities; if for all h 2 H, At(h) is increasing in the strong set order in t
and if, for all i 2 N2 I, ui
t satises the single-crossing condition in (si
;t).
Theorem 3 Let fΓ(t):t 2 Tg be an increasing family of extensive-form games. Let
t;t0 2 T with t  t0. The smallest (largest) SPNE of Γ(t) is smaller, as an element of S,
than the smallest (largest) SPNE of Γ(t0).
Proof: Let t and t0 be the extended best-response correspondences of Γ(t)a n dΓ ( t0),
respectively. An argument similar to the proof that the extended best-response function
is monotone increasing in the proof of Theorem 1 establishes that, for any s 2S , t(s)i s
smaller than t0(s) in the strong set order. The result then follows from Theorem 2.5.2
in Topkis (1998). 
4 Restrictiveness of Complementarities
Optional BoS in the introduction is a game of strategic complementarities. Optional
BoS II in Figure 3 cannot be made into a game of strategic complementarities. First, say
that Yes is larger than No and repeat the argument from the introduction: An increase
in One's strategy from No-OO to Yes-OO makes Two shift from B to O in the game
following Yes. Strategic complementarities requires then that the action O is larger than
B at this information set. But then, this gives a decreasing response when we shift
15RL
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Figure 4: Payos to Player One in the game in Figure 2
from No-OB to Yes-OB. The solution in the introduction was to change the order on
fYes;Nog. But here this clearly gives rise to the same problem in the subgame following
No.
Since BoS is a game of strategic complementarities, Optional BoS II shows that the
property of having complementarities is not robust to the addition of an irrelevant move.
This is true also in normal-form games, not really the reason why complementarities are
especially restrictive in extensive-form games.
More importantly, o the path specied by a strategy prole, players are indierent
between actions. This indierence makes the single-crossing property kick in. If the
information set h is o the path of a strategy prole (si;s −i)t h e np l a y e ri is indierent
between strategies that dier on A(h). Now, if s0−i is a larger strategy, and h is on the
path of (si;s 0−i), then it must be that payos are such that, if a;a0 2 A(h)a n da is smaller
than a0,t h e na is preferred to a0. That is, preferences have to coincide with the order
on actions for every strategy prole that has h \on its path". This is the reason why
complementarities are specially restrictive in extensive-form games. An open question is
to characterize the set of extensive-form games with strategic complementarities. This
has not been done for normal-form games, and it seems that the dynamic strategic
interactions present special diculties.
Finally, I will show that the game in Figure 2 is a game of strategic complementarities.
Order the actions so that L is larger than R, l is larger than r and L0 is larger that R0.
Consider Figure 4. The two matrices to the right show the payos to player One for each
of the eight possible strategy proles in this game. The Figure is intended to illustrate
the lattice structure on strategies.
16Fix Two's strategy s2 = r. We needto checkthat s1 7! u1(s1;r) is quasisupermodular.
Here, u1(RL0;r)=0<u 1(RL0 ^ LR0;r)=u1(RR0;r) = 3, so the requirement in the
denition of quasisupermodularity is vacuous. Fix s2 = l,t h e nu1(RL0 ^ LR0;l)=
u1(RR0;l)=0a n du1(RL0;l)=0s ow en e e du1(LR0;l)  u1(RL0 _ LR0;l). Which is
satised since u1(RL0 _ LR0;l)=u1(LL0;l)=2a n du1(LR0;l) = 2. Now, we need to
check that the players' payos satisfy the single-crossing property. Note from Figure 4
that, when s2 = r, no increase in a strategy by player One is protable. Since r<lthe





Figure 5: Gain from increasing Two's strategy: u2(s1;l) − u2(s1;r).
To see that Two's payos satisfy the single-crossing property, consider Figure 5. The
gure shows the gain to Two u2(s1;l) − u2(s1;r) from increasing his strategy from r to
l. It is seen directly from the gure that whenever u2(s1;l) − u2(s1;r)  0a n ds1 <s 10
then u2(s10;l) − u2(s10;r)  0. This establishes that the game in Figure 2 is a game of
strategic complementarities.
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